Detalles de Publicación


    Costo-Efectividad de Instrumentos Económicos para el Control de la Contaminación. El Caso del Uso de Leña

    • Fecha: 2009
    • Investigador: Carlos Alberto Chávez Rebolledo
    • Publicación ISI: N
    • Publicación SCIELO: S
    • Número de Páginas: 28
    • Volumen: 46
    • Referencia: Chávez, C., Goméz, W. y S. Briceño, "Costo-Efectividad de Instrumentos Económicos para el Control de la Contaminación. El Caso del Uso de Leña", Cuadernos de Economía 46, 197-224 (2009)
    • Correo electrónico: cchavez@udec.cl
    • KeyWords:
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    The Choice of Policy Instruments to Control Pollution Under Costly Enforcement and Incomplete Information

    • Fecha: 2009
    • Investigador: Carlos Alberto Chávez Rebolledo
    • Publicación ISI: S
    • Publicación SCIELO: N
    • Número de Páginas: 21
    • Volumen: 12(2)
    • Referencia: Chávez, C.A., Villena, M.G. y J.K. Stranlund, "The Choice of Policy Instruments to Control Pollution Under Costly Enforcement and Incomplete Information", Journal of Applied Economics 12(2), 207-227 (2009)
    • Correo electrónico: cchavez@udec.cl
    • KeyWords:
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    Controlling Urban Air Pollution Caused by Households: Uncertainty, Prices, and Income

    • Fecha: 2011
    • Investigador: Carlos Alberto Chávez Rebolledo
    • Publicación ISI: S
    • Publicación SCIELO: N
    • Número de Páginas:
    • Volumen:
    • Referencia: Chávez, C.A., Stranlund, J.K. y W. Gómez, "Controlling Urban Air Pollution Caused by Households: Uncertainty, Prices, and Income", Journal of Environmental Management (2011)
    • Correo electrónico: cchavez@udec.cl
    • KeyWords: Keywords, efficiency, urban air pollution, nonpoint pollution, environmental policy, uncertainty
    • Abstract: We examine the control of air pollution caused by households burning wood for heating and cooking in the developing world. Since the problem is one of controlling emissions from nonpoint sources, regulations are likely to be directed at household choices of wood consumption and combustion technologies. Moreover, these choices are subtractions from, or contributions to, the pure public good of air quality. Consequently, the efficient policy design is not independent of the distribution of household income. Since it is unrealistic to assume that environmental authorities can make lump sum income transfers part of control policies, efficient control of air pollution caused by wood consumption entails a higher tax on wood consumption and a higher subsidy for more efficient combustion technologies for higher income households. Among other difficulties, implementing a policy to promote the adoption of cleaner combustion technologies must overcome the seemingly paradoxical result that efficient control calls for higher technology subsidies for higher income households.